

## INDUSTRY OUTLOOK

Rate this Research



## 2014 Outlook – US Toll Roads

Slow Recovery in Traffic Growth Shows Staying Power

We changed our outlook for the US Toll Road Industry to stable from negative on December 3, 2013. This outlook expresses our expectations for the fundamental business conditions in the industry over the next 12 to 18 months.

## Table of Contents:

STABILIZING TRAFFIC AND GROWING REVENUES TILT OUR OUTLOOK TO STABLE	2
MODEST TRAFFIC GROWTH ALONG WITH HIGHER, BUT UNEVEN TOLLS, WILL PUSH UP REVENUE IN 2014	4
INCREASING LEVERAGE REMAINS AN IMPORTANT RISK	5
MOODY'S RELATED RESEARCH	6

## Analyst Contacts:

NEW YORK	+1.212.553.1653
Maria Matesanz Senior Vice President maria.matesanz@moodys.com	+1.212.553.7241
Chee Mee Hu Managing Director - Project Finance cheemee.hu@moodys.com	+1.212.553.3665

- » **We are changing our outlook for the US Toll Road Industry to stable from negative, based on our view that the slow and steady recovery in traffic growth is sustainable into 2014.** We expect 2014 traffic growth of about 1.5% on a median basis for rated toll roads, as the US economy strengthens. This traffic growth rate marks what we believe is a sustainable comeback from a nearly 3% decline in 2009, when our outlook turned negative on the industry.
- » **We expect toll revenue will see a mid-single-digit percentage gain in both 2013 and 2014, driven mainly by continued widespread toll-rate increases and modest traffic growth.** This revenue growth rate marks a slowdown from 2012, when toll revenue climbed 11.2% on the back of large rate increases.
- » **Increasing leverage remains an important risk.** State and local governments continue to exert demands on the excess cash flows of toll roads to subsidize their own capital and operating needs, or have shifted some of their transportation financing responsibilities to existing toll roads.
- » **We could shift back to a negative outlook if the US economy falls back into recession or gasoline prices rise.** We note that toll rate increases could face some push back from toll road users and thereby depress revenue growth, particularly if the economy falls back into recession. Reduced revenue would hurt financial margins and liquidity, and negative pressures would become even more acute if gas prices rise.

### Stabilizing traffic and growing revenues tilt our outlook to stable


We are changing our outlook to stable from negative, based on our view that the slow and steady recovery in traffic growth is sustainable into 2014. We expect traffic growth to rise about 1.5% in 2014 on a median basis (see chart 1), based on year-to-date trends for the 10 largest toll roads we rate,<sup>1</sup> as the US economy strengthens. This rate marks what we believe is a sustainable comeback from a nearly 3% decline in 2009, when our outlook turned negative on the industry.

We expect toll road traffic to trail US GDP growth of 2% to 3% in 2014 (Moody's forecast). Slower-than-GDP national traffic growth reflects demographic shifts and changing driving patterns for younger drivers, meaning that the rate of traffic growth is slowing down overall and so the slower, albeit more stable, growth rates reflect a "new normal." What gives us confidence that expected growth rates are sustainable is that even slow-growing established toll roads in developed areas, such as [Bay Area Toll Authority](#) (Aa3 stable), [Illinois State Toll Highway Authority](#) (Aa3 stable) and [New York State Thruway Authority](#) (A2 stable), are reporting modest traffic gains this year through September of about 1%, compared with a historical rate of just under 2% before the recession.

EXHIBIT 1

#### US Toll Roads: Median Total Traffic Growth

Annual Growth Total Transactions (%)




Note: 2013 and 2014 are our estimates.

Source: Moody's Public Finance Monitoring System/Municipal Financial Ratio Analysis database of publicly rated government-owned toll roads

EXHIBIT 2

#### US Toll Roads: Operating Revenue and Traffic



Note: Operating revenue is shown on the left scale and transactions are shown on the right scale.

Source: Moody's Public Finance Monitoring System/Municipal Financial Ratio Analysis database for publicly rated government-owned toll road.

<sup>1</sup> Largest by revenue

Toll road traffic rose in 2012 and is growing at about 1% in 2013, although the pace is uneven across the US, with growth strongest in states that weathered the recession better than others, such as Texas, and weakest growth in economically challenged or undiversified areas, or where large toll increases took effect, such as the New York metropolitan area. For instance, the [New Jersey Turnpike Authority](#) (A3 stable) saw a 50% toll increase in 2012 that reduced traffic by 3.5%. The [Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority](#) (Aa3 stable) implemented a toll increase in March 2013 to yield a 7.5% revenue increase and this has lowered traffic by 1.1% through August.

Median year-over-year traffic growth remained almost flat at 0.5% following a slight 0.3% decline in 2011. The median five-year compound annual decline of 0.7% in 2012 was virtually the same as the 0.8% compound annual decline in 2011 medians, which is indicative of the continued slow traffic recovery following the recession.

Of the 42 government-owned US toll roads we track, roads located in high-growth states such as Florida and Texas stand out in terms of traffic growth rates:

- » The [North Texas Tollway Authority](#) (A2 stable) in Dallas significantly outperformed the Moody's 2012 median of 0.5% with 13.9% traffic growth from 2011-12, in part because of the opening of new roadway segments and sustained population growth in the service area.
- » The [Central Texas Regional Mobility Authority](#) (Baa2 stable) in Austin also outperformed the median in 2012 with 11.8% traffic growth, supported by ongoing traffic ramp-up as new segments opened, and population growth.
- » Traffic growth for Florida's Turnpike ([Florida Department of Transportation](#); Aa3 stable) resumed at 1.8% in 2012 and into fiscal 2014, despite a large rate increase in July 2012.
- » Some toll roads lag behind in terms of median traffic growth rates, including the **Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority**, which saw a 0.3% decline in 2012 and a 1.1% decline through August because of toll increases, and the [Nassau County Bridge Authority](#) (A3 stable), which saw traffic drop 5.7% because of Hurricane Sandy-related closures.


We are also seeing signs of traffic recovery for some single-asset roads, such as the [Foothill-Eastern Transportation Corridor Agency](#) (Ba1 stable) and [San Joaquin Hills Transportation Corridor Agency](#) (B1 stable) roads in Orange County, California, which have seen 2.8% and 5% traffic growth, respectively, through October 2013, compared to the same period in 2012.

Most government-rated toll roads define traffic as one passenger or commercial vehicle passing through a booth or gantry (or tolling point).

**We could shift back to a negative outlook if the US economy falls back into recession or gasoline prices rise.** We note that rate increases could face some push back from toll road users and thus depress revenue growth, particularly if the economy falls back into recession. Reduced revenues would hurt financial margins and liquidity, and negative pressures would become even more acute if gas prices rise. However, based on the US Energy Information Administration's gasoline-price forecast in October (see chart), we do not expect a significant increase in the cost of fuel at the pump.

It is unlikely we would take a positive view of the industry in 2014. We would have to see sustained traffic and revenue growth over a two-year period in order to move to a positive outlook.

EXHIBIT 3  
US Retail Gasoline Prices  
Dollars per gallon



Note: Retail prices include state and federal taxes  
Source: EIA, *Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2013*

### Modest Traffic Growth Along With Higher, but Uneven Tolls, Will Push Up Revenue in 2014

**We expect toll revenues will see a mid-single-digit percentage gain in both 2013 and 2014, driven mainly by continued widespread expected toll-rate increases and modest traffic growth.** This revenue growth rate marks a slowdown from 2012, when toll revenue climbed 11.2% on the back of large rate increases. We expect increases to be unevenly distributed across the sector as some toll roads are planning no rate increases, some are implementing inflation-indexed increases and others larger, one-off increases.

A number of toll roads have recently implemented inflation-indexed or multi-year toll increases, such as the Florida Turnpike, the [Central Texas Regional Mobility Authority](#) (Baa2 stable), the [Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority](#) (A3 positive) and the [Ohio Turnpike and Infrastructure Commission](#) (Aa3 stable). We see indexed tolls as helping to make revenue growth more predictable and also insulating traffic levels from rate spikes that contribute to volatility. Revenue predictability in turn enables toll roads to more accurately plan and budget for both operating and capital expenses, which we view as a credit-positive.

Toll roads that haven't raised toll rates are either not leveraging up or may be under-investing in capital asset maintenance, at the risk of incurring higher costs down the road. Some toll roads are delaying the inevitable and will face steeper increases to support substantial amounts of debt for new projects, such as the **New York State Thruway Authority**, which is currently financing a replacement for the Tappan Zee Bridge at a cost of \$4 billion, but has yet to increase tolls to support the added debt service. We estimate tolls on the new bridge will be nearly double the current \$5 rate. Others are issuing substantial amounts of debt to support non-toll projects, such as the Pennsylvania State Turnpike Commission (Aa3 stable) and the Ohio Turnpike, and this will contribute to steady increases in toll rates, at least at the rate of inflation, which is currently running at about 1.0%.

### Increasing leverage remains an important risk

State and local governments continue to exert demands on the excess cash flows of toll roads to subsidize their own capital and operating needs, or have shifted some of their transportation financing responsibilities to existing toll roads.

This trend accelerated in the recent recession as governments faced political pressures against raising taxes and instead turned to toll roads to help finance various infrastructure projects. The Ohio Turnpike, the [New Jersey Turnpike Authority](#) (A3 stable) and the [Harris County Toll Authority](#) (Aa3 stable) in Texas illustrate this trend. And the Pennsylvania Turnpike and Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority in New York have well-established transfers of excess cash flow to subsidize state-wide transportation and transit systems. The Pennsylvania Turnpike is a particularly telling example of an increase in leverage owing to transfers that resulted in a downgrade of the senior lien bonds to A1 from Aa3 earlier this year.

The use of toll roads as “cash cows” to finance non-tolled projects has increased leverage without a corresponding investment in toll road capacity, as seen in a near doubling of median debt per roadway mile from 2008 to 2012. However, we note that this added leverage did not depress median debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs) in fiscal 2012, which remained at 1.69 times on a net revenue basis given widespread toll rate increases.

States and local governments are proposing and implementing other ways of financing projects that could help moderate future debt leverage for established toll roads. These include the creation of new tolling authorities in states like Delaware, Kentucky, Georgia, North Carolina and Virginia; the implementation of comprehensive development agreements (or CDAs) with existing agencies as well as the use of public-private partnerships (P3s) and private-equity investments. The creation of new tolling authorities with independent toll-raising and debt-issuing ability may help alleviate the future leverage burden for existing toll roads.

## Moody's Related Research

### Outlook:

- » [US Toll Roads: Traffic and Revenue Stabilization Trends Emerging But Need to Show Sustainability, February, 2013 \(149658\)](#)

### Special Comments:

- » [Managed Lanes are HOT! Unique Risks and benefits versus traditional tolling, May 2013 \(153659\)](#)
- » [European Toll Road Operators: Weak Traffic Trends to Continue, December 2012 \(147994\)](#)
- » [Milking the Cash Cow: US Toll Roads Are Reliable Source of Cash for Struggling State and Local Governments but Rate Affordability Exerts Credit Pressure, February 2012 \(138832\)](#)
- » [Chilean Toll Roads: Strong credit fundamentals drive concession activity, October 2012 \(142211\)](#)
- » [Credit Risks and Rewards of Electronic Toll Collection, February 2011 \(131073\)](#)

### Credit Focus:

- » [ASF, APRR and Sanef: Peer comparison of three French toll roads, December 2012 \(147990\)](#)

### Global Financial Risk Perspective:

- » [Global Macro Outlook 2013-15: Navigating towards calmer waters, November, 2013 \(159743\)](#)

### Rating Methodologies:

- » [Government Owned Toll Roads, October 2012 \(143776\)](#)
- » [Moody's Rating Methodology-Operating Toll Roads, December 2006 \(101003\)](#)

To access any of these reports, click on the entry above. Note that these references are current as of the date of publication of this report and that more recent reports may be available. All research may not be available to all clients.

Rate this Research



---

 Report Number: 160843

---

 Author  
 Maria Matesanz

---

 Production Associate  
 Srinivasan Raghavan

© 2013 Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and/or its licensors and affiliates (collectively, "MOODY'S"). All rights reserved.

**CREDIT RATINGS ISSUED BY MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC. ("MIS") AND ITS AFFILIATES ARE MOODY'S CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE RELATIVE FUTURE CREDIT RISK OF ENTITIES, CREDIT COMMITMENTS, OR DEBT OR DEBT-LIKE SECURITIES, AND CREDIT RATINGS AND RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS PUBLISHED BY MOODY'S ("MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS") MAY INCLUDE MOODY'S CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE RELATIVE FUTURE CREDIT RISK OF ENTITIES, CREDIT COMMITMENTS, OR DEBT OR DEBT-LIKE SECURITIES. MOODY'S DEFINES CREDIT RISK AS THE RISK THAT AN ENTITY MAY NOT MEET ITS CONTRACTUAL, FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AS THEY COME DUE AND ANY ESTIMATED FINANCIAL LOSS IN THE EVENT OF DEFAULT. CREDIT RATINGS DO NOT ADDRESS ANY OTHER RISK, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO: LIQUIDITY RISK, MARKET VALUE RISK, OR PRICE VOLATILITY. CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY'S OPINIONS INCLUDED IN MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT STATEMENTS OF CURRENT OR HISTORICAL FACT. CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS DO NOT CONSTITUTE OR PROVIDE INVESTMENT OR FINANCIAL ADVICE, AND CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT AND DO NOT PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS TO PURCHASE, SELL, OR HOLD PARTICULAR SECURITIES. NEITHER CREDIT RATINGS NOR MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS COMMENT ON THE SUITABILITY OF AN INVESTMENT FOR ANY PARTICULAR INVESTOR. MOODY'S ISSUES ITS CREDIT RATINGS AND PUBLISHES MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS WITH THE EXPECTATION AND UNDERSTANDING THAT EACH INVESTOR WILL MAKE ITS OWN STUDY AND EVALUATION OF EACH SECURITY THAT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR PURCHASE, HOLDING, OR SALE.**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROTECTED BY LAW, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND NONE OF SUCH INFORMATION MAY BE COPIED OR OTHERWISE REPRODUCED, REPACKAGED, FURTHER TRANSMITTED, TRANSFERRED, DISSEMINATED, REDISTRIBUTED OR RESOLD, OR STORED FOR SUBSEQUENT USE FOR ANY SUCH PURPOSE, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN ANY FORM OR MANNER OR BY ANY MEANS WHATSOEVER, BY ANY PERSON WITHOUT MOODY'S PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT.

All information contained herein is obtained by MOODY'S from sources believed by it to be accurate and reliable. Because of the possibility of human or mechanical error as well as other factors, however, all information contained herein is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when appropriate, independent third-party sources. However, MOODY'S is not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify or validate information received in the rating process. Under no circumstances shall MOODY'S have any liability to any person or entity for (a) any loss or damage in whole or in part caused by, resulting from, or relating to, any error (negligent or otherwise) or other circumstance or contingency within or outside the control of MOODY'S or any of its directors, officers, employees or agents in connection with the procurement, collection, compilation, analysis, interpretation, communication, publication or delivery of any such information, or (b) any direct, indirect, special, consequential, compensatory or incidental damages whatsoever (including without limitation, lost profits), even if MOODY'S is advised in advance of the possibility of such damages, resulting from the use of or inability to use, any such information. The ratings, financial reporting analysis, projections, and other observations, if any, constituting part of the information contained herein are, and must be construed solely as, statements of opinion and not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, sell or hold any securities. Each user of the information contained herein must make its own study and evaluation of each security it may consider purchasing, holding or selling.

NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, COMPLETENESS, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF ANY SUCH RATING OR OTHER OPINION OR INFORMATION IS GIVEN OR MADE BY MOODY'S IN ANY FORM OR MANNER WHATSOEVER.

MIS, a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of Moody's Corporation ("MCO"), hereby discloses that most issuers of debt securities (including corporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferred stock rated by MIS have, prior to assignment of any rating, agreed to pay to MIS for appraisal and rating services rendered by it fees ranging from \$1,500 to approximately \$2,500,000. MCO and MIS also maintain policies and procedures to address the independence of MIS's ratings and rating processes. Information regarding certain affiliations that may exist between directors of MCO and rated entities, and between entities who hold ratings from MIS and have also publicly reported to the SEC an ownership interest in MCO of more than 5%, is posted annually at [www.moody's.com](http://www.moody's.com) under the heading "Shareholder Relations — Corporate Governance — Director and Shareholder Affiliation Policy."

For Australia only: Any publication into Australia of this document is pursuant to the Australian Financial Services License of MOODY'S affiliate, Moody's Investors Service Pty Limited ABN 61 003 399 657AFSL 336969 and/or Moody's Analytics Australia Pty Ltd ABN 94 105 136 972 AFSL 383569 (as applicable). This document is intended to be provided only to "wholesale clients" within the meaning of section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. By continuing to access this document from within Australia, you represent to MOODY'S that you are, or are accessing the document as a representative of, a "wholesale client" and that neither you nor the entity you represent will directly or indirectly disseminate this document or its contents to "retail clients" within the meaning of section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. MOODY'S credit rating is an opinion as to the creditworthiness of a debt obligation of the issuer, not on the equity securities of the issuer or any form of security that is available to retail clients. It would be dangerous for retail clients to make any investment decision based on MOODY'S credit rating. If in doubt you should contact your financial or other professional adviser.